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Abstract
This paper views the housing and credit bubble 2001-2008 in a
stylized manner, namely as a sequence starting with a financial
innovation in 2001 followed by the superimposition of other
financial innovations leading to the prevalence of uncertainty in
Knight’s sense and ending in the last quarter of 2008 with both
market failure and regulation failure. This ‘debt bubble sequence’
is just a slice of a dynamic process of stupefying complexity
involving ignorance in a fundamental way. Few analysts would
deny that a financial innovation, namely the sub-prime mortgage,
combined with market participants’ ignorance about the size and
location of the risk underlying complex financial products was a
critical factor conducive to the financial meltdown 2007-2008. To
the extent that financial innovation does bear the blame, the most
obvious question is whether anything can be done to help reduce
the degree of public’s ignorance about financial innovations and
to prevent destabilizing innovations from entering the market.
The main claim of this paper is that society should be involved in
exercising directive intelligence through an appropriate
institutional arrangement over the intricacies and technicalities
inherent to financial innovations. Specifically, the paper
proposes a new institutional arrangement conceived with the aim
of strengthening financial system reliability and breaking the
‘government regulation-financial innovation’ vicious circle.
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1. Introduction
Uncertainty in economic life has long been recognized as a destabilizing
factor. Ignorance –in the sense of lack of understanding of economic information– is
generally considered as a less relevant factor in the context of economic stability. The
reasons for neglecting the importance of ignorance are seldom explicit. The tacit
presumption is that ‘transparency’ means that people have easy access to all the
relevant economic information and this availability of information automatically
implies an understanding of the possibilities and limitations of the economic issue in
question. For lack of a better term, I will call this presumption Postulate of Automatic
Understanding (PAU).
The current global financial crisis that first struck in August 2007 suggests that
the PAU is not universally valid. We live in a digital economy where our ability to
trade esoteric financial products emerging from financial innovations vastly exceeds
our ability to understand (and value) these financial instruments. The information
about mortgages revolving around dodgy loans and on a pyramid of complicated debt
products built on top of them was publicly available, but many individuals were
unable (not unwilling) to understand the toxic nature of these financial assets and their
explosive consequences on the real economy.
The present paper builds on an analysis of the recent past, but it is essentially
about the future. The structural pillars of the argument developed in this paper are a
guiding principle and a stylized version of the debt bubble 2001-2008. The guiding
principle emerges from the following passage:
Many of the greatest economic evils of our time are the
fruits of risk, uncertainty, and ignorance. It is because
particular individuals, fortunate in situation or in abilities,
are able to take advantage of uncertainty and ignorance,
and also because for the same reason big business is often
a lottery, that great inequalities of wealth come about; and
these same factors are also the cause of the unemployment
of labour, or the disappointment of reasonable business
expectations, and of the impairment of efficiency and
production. Yet the cure lies outside the operations of
individuals; it may even be to the interest of individuals to
aggravate the disease. I believe that the cure for these things
is partly to be sought in the deliberate control of the currency
and of credit by a central institution, and partly in the
collection and dissemination on a great scale of data relating
to the business situation, including the full publicity, by law
if necessary, of all business facts which is useful to know.
These measures would involve society in exercising directive
intelligence through some appropriate organ of action over
many of the inner intricacies of private business, yet it would
leave private initiative and enterprise unhindered. Even if
these measures prove to be insufficient, nevertheless, they will
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furnish us with better knowledge than we have now for taking
the next step.
One would be inclined to guess that the source of the preceding passage could
well be the speech of one of the Group of 20 leaders who met in Washington in
November 2008 to redesign the global financial system. The author is John Maynard
Keynes. What is even more surprising is that the paper containing this long paragraph
was first published in 1926, a few years before the Great Crash of October 1929. 1
This paper views the housing and credit bubble 2001-2008 in a stylized
manner, namely as a sequence starting with a financial innovation in 2001 followed
by the superimposition of other financial innovations leading to the prevalence of
uncertainty in Knight’s sense and ending in the last quarter of 2008 with both market
failure and regulation failure. This ‘debt bubble sequence’ is just a slice of a dynamic
process of stupefying complexity involving ignorance in a fundamental way. 2
With all probability, this global financial crisis will prompt a tide of
regulation. How far should the balance between governments and markets shift? It is
generally agreed that too many new regulations could backfire. What is needed is
‘relevant’ regulation. Some rebalancing is needed in financial regulation where
financial innovation outpaced an old supervisory regime.
An agenda for financial market reform is already developing in America,
Europe and Australia. For example, establishing clearing mechanisms for credit
derivatives –especially, collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps–,
increased control on hedge funds and overhauling ratings agencies appear to be key
global priorities. However, a change in the international regulatory regime will most
likely induce profit-seeking innovators to devote their creative energies to develop
new financial ideas and concepts to circumvent the new regulations.
Few analysts would deny that a financial innovation, namely the sub-prime
mortgage, combined with market participants’ ignorance about the size and location
of the risk underlying complex financial products was a critical factor conducive to
the financial meltdown 2007-2008. To the extent that financial innovation does bear
the blame, the most obvious question is whether anything can be done to help reduce
the degree of public’s ignorance about financial innovations and to prevent
destabilizing innovations from entering the market.
The main claim of this paper is that society should be involved in ‘exercising
directive intelligence’ through an appropriate institutional arrangement over the
intricacies and technicalities inherent to financial innovations. Specifically, the paper
proposes a new institutional arrangement conceived with the aim of strengthening
financial system reliability and breaking the ‘government regulation-financial
innovation’ vicious circle. Even die-hard free marketeers should concede that there is
a real opportunity for improving the effectiveness of the financial markets through
regulatory institutions. One of the fundamental challenges for social scientists is to
find these new arrangements.
1

The essay in question is “The End of Laissez-Faire,” based on two lectures given by Keynes, one at
Oxford in November 1924 and the other at the University of Berlin in June 1926. Keynes (1926).
2
It seems premature to assert that the financial crisis is over. However, having an end point for the debt
bubble sequence is useful to make the description more concrete.
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To make the case for this proposal, I develop two arguments. First, I show that
the issue of ignorance is assumed away in the established approaches to financial
market efficiency. Second, I use the understandings won by economists who have
studied financial innovation empirically to point out the existence of a peculiar
innovative interaction between the government and the financial sector engendering a
vicious circle.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, I indicate that the
PAU is inextricably linked to the efficient markets hypothesis and the assumption of
rational expectations. Section 3 consists of a very brief description of the 2001-2008
debt bubble as well as a glimpse of evidence casting doubt on the PAU in order to
establish the first part of the background to my proposal. The second part is presented
in Section 4 where a possible definition of ‘toxic’ financial innovation is introduced
and the vicious circle nature of the innovative interaction between governments and
financial markets is brought into sharp focus. Section 5 highlights the need for
relevant regulation of financial markets in the light of the recent regulation failure. In
Section 6, I outline a specific policy proposal to keep pace with financial innovations
and strike a balance between financial innovation and economic stability. The paper
concludes with a summary and some remarks.
2. The Postulate of Automatic Understanding (PAU)
The assertion that information availability guarantees understanding is
counterintuitive. A substantial proportion of individuals do not seem to have either the
resolving power or the time necessary for interpreting the meaning of the vast amount
of economic data available to them. For example, if one wants to find information
about the financial instrument introduced by Merrill Lynch in 1985 known as LYON
(Liquid Yield Option Note) a good starting point is McConnell and Schwartz (1992).
In this article we can find that the LYON innovation is a complex security consisting
of the combination of four ideas: it is a zero coupon, convertible, callable, and
puttable bond. Abundant additional information can be found in Google. Processing
and understanding the existing information about LYON is not impossibly difficult
but it is both intellectually demanding and time consuming. 3 Thus, an automatic
grasping of the possibilities and limitations of this financial instrument does not
necessarily follow from the availability of information. Some individuals would
probably base their decision to use LYON on the broad name recognition of the
issuer, not on their precise understanding of the product.
We do not have to dig deep to find additional examples showing that the
presumption ‘transparency implies understanding’ is not true in general. In the field of
financial innovations, we can easily name exotic instruments that are well-known for
financial engineers but difficult to understand for the layperson: butterfly spreads,
collateralized-mortgage bonds, portfolio insurance and synthetic cash are a few.
Furthermore, the tacit presumption ‘information availability implies
understanding’ appears to overlook evidence emerging from information processing
psychology and cognitive load research pioneered by the 1978 Nobel Prize winner
Herbert Simon (1979, p. 507). A topic –any topic, economic or other– is difficult to
3

Understanding LYON requires at least a working knowledge of elementary finance theory.
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understand if it involves high element activity. For example, understanding practical
economic issues may be difficult for many individuals because the learner has to
process large amount of interactive elements (empirical data, principles of economics,
conceptual frameworks, and so on). In some areas such as finance, where knowledge
is cumulative, lack of automation of prior concepts may prevent understanding of
subsequent concepts. To complicate things even further, individuals may have
understood a new concept such as ‘credit default swap’ despite being unable to use it
in a new context such as ‘collateralized debt obligations.’ 4
It is true that the Internet has made it possible for virtually anyone to collect
vast amounts of information. But it is true, too, that the data are spread around in
many places. Sometimes one has to wander from site to site as if you were solving a
jigsaw puzzle. In addition, multiple sources of information split attention and tend to
retard the process of understanding.
A reliable inference from the foregoing is as follows: the existence of
information is necessary but not sufficient to eliminate the ignorance factor, and
therefore, the use of the tacit presumption or Postulate of Automatic Understanding
(PAU) requires caution.
The PAU has its roots in the theory of efficient markets. 5 An efficient market
is one in which all the available information is quickly understood by the economic
agents and immediately incorporated into the market prices. Efficient prices are
equilibrium prices subject to the information available when prices are established.
This suggests that efficient markets and rational expectations are related to each other.
Indeed, the assumption of rational expectations asserts that individuals take into
account all the information available to them and they do not make systematic errors.
For this assumption to be operative, it is necessary that individuals quickly understand
the information available. Consequently, the efficient market hypothesis and the
assumption of rational expectations share the PAU.
Beyond any doubt, the efficient market hypothesis and the assumption of
rational expectations constitute enduring contributions to our stock of economic
knowledge. They work exceedingly well when uncertainty about the future can be
treated as risk, that is, in terms of a well and correctly specified probability
distribution of possible future events. 6
Regrettably, in a world plagued with uncertainty in the strict sense the
applicability of these approaches vanishes. This point was recognized more than forty
years ago by Robert E. Lucas, the intellectual leader of the rational expectations
approach to macroeconomics and 1995 Nobel Prize winner. Lucas emphasized that
4

For a rigorous explanation of cognitive load theory see Sweller (1999).
As Shiller (1978, p. 6) explained, the statistical theory of martingales was applied to economics by
Paul A. Samuelson and Benot Mandelbrot, and this in turn, led to the efficient market approach about
the behaviour of security prices.
6
The terms ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ are used throughout this paper in the Knight’s sense. Frank Knight
(1921, esp. pp. 19-20) made the distinction between two types of randomness: risk (calculable
probability) and uncertainty (incalculable probability, in that it is ‘unmeasurable’). The expressions
‘Knight’s uncertainty’ and ‘uncertainty in the strict sense’ will be used interchangeably.
5
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the rational expectations approach, which identifies subjective and true probabilities,
is not applicable in situations of uncertainty in the strict sense. Specifically, Lucas
suggested that his approach will most
likely be useful in situations in which the probabilities of
interest concern a fairly well recurrent event, situations of
“risk” in Knight’s terminology. In situations of risk, the
hypothesis of rational behaviour on the part of agents will
have usable content, so that behaviour may be explainable
in terms of economic theory. In such situations, expectations
are rational in Muth’s sense. In cases of uncertainty, economic
reasoning will be of no value.
Lucas (1977, p. 15)
It is worth noting that bubbles are ruled out by the existence of rational
expectations. 7 Therefore, the process conducive to the October 2008 bursting of the
debt bubble must entail some sort of non-rational expectations. Surely that was a
failure to understand all available information and surely that was the perpetration of
systematic errors due to ignorance.
3. Validity of the PAU during the Debt Bubble
We are still in the middle of a global financial crisis that became acute in
August 2007 when the money market interest rates rose drastically. What caused the
financial crisis? There is no simple answer to this question. However, the argument I
present in this paper suggests that any answer should involve a web of financial
innovations conducive to pervasive uncertainty in Knight’s sense. This is not to deny
that the debt bubble had several concurrent causes including loose monetary policy
(the US Federal Reserve kept interest rates too low for too long), the misconceived
belief that rapid appreciation of homes and equities is a universal law of the global
economy, and poor supervision. There were also other factors such as greed and big
executive bonuses, but in hindsight they appear to be at a lesser level of importance.
Modern finance in combination with the Internet succeeded in creating an
extraordinary complex dynamics revolving around sub-prime mortgages,
securitization and other financial innovations. This dynamics generated a debt bubble
that burst in the last quarter of 2008.
For analytical purposes, the debt bubble can be seen as a sequence starting in
2001 and culminating in 2008 with the collapse of the global financial system. In
rough outline, there are four major components or terms of this sequence that can be
described as follows. First, the US banks and non-bank lenders provided home loans
to people who could not possibly pay them back. Second, these mortgages were all
packed up and Wall Street sold them to different investors creating an immense
amount of financial products. Third, neither the shareholders nor the top executives of
investment banks had a clear understanding of what the risk takers were doing. There
was no guarantee that yesterday’s odds would be the same tomorrow. All in all, the
7

Under rational expectations bubbles simply cannot occur. For the rigorous proof of this proposition,
see Tirole (1982). He shows that in a fully dynamic rational expectations equilibrium, price bubbles do
not exist.
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economic agents traded financial products plagued with uncertainty in the strict sense,
not risk. Fourth, after the realization that highly leveraged financial institutions were
holding a substantial proportion of securitized American sub-prime mortgages the
effectiveness of the financial sector was reduced dramatically and the world faced a
major financial disruption: the interaction between global financial intermediaries and
the real economy largely ceased, and the stock markets around the world crashed in
October 2008. 8
An obvious lesson emerging from this sequence of events is that financial
institutions that work well in normal times may become counterproductive when toxic
innovations are introduced in the financial system. But there is a less obvious message
underlying the evolution of the debt bubble that can be deciphered as follows.
It is generally agreed that during the period 2001-2008 financial information
was abundant. One basic question immediately suggests itself. If the relevant
information was publicly available, why the market participants could not see the
catastrophic end coming? There is a glimpse of evidence suggesting that many
economic agents were unable (not unwilling) to understand the available financial
information due to the technicalities involved in the chain of complex financial
products.
It is no exaggeration to say that individuals are not superior financial
engineers. The financial information was veiled in technical nomenclature (for
example, ‘mortgage-backed securities,’ ‘auction-rate securities’ and ‘three-month
LIBOR/Overnight Swap spread’) and acronyms (such as ARMs, Alt-A, MBSs, OIS
spread, CDOs, CDSs, and SIVs) difficult to understand or decipher at first glance.
This compelling point is forcibly made by Paul Kedrosky:
There is an entire language required to understand this
new generation of financial technologies, from credit
default swaps to collateralized debt obligations to
residential mortgage-backed securities, not to mention
the corresponding three - and four-letter abbreviations.
There’s also data on current account deficits and yield
spreads. Most people, faced with this tsunami of data,
do only the rational thing: they give up.
Kedrosky (2008, p. 21)
Apparently, the financial jargon was also unintelligible for some senior bank
executives. For example, there is evidence suggesting that in addition to the
Citigroup’s deficient risk-management models, its top executives did not understand
the relevant information available to them. According to Citigroup insiders, Charles
Prince –former Citigroup chief executive– did not have a working knowledge of the
CDOs:
A former Citigroup executive said of the bank’s big CDO push:
“Chuck Prince going down to the corporate investment bank in
late 2002 was the start of that process. Chuck was totally new
8

More details on the debt bubble sequence can be found in the appendix to the present paper.
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to the job. He didn’t know a CDO from a grocery list, so he
looked for someone for advice and support. That person was
Rubin. And Rubin had always been an advocate of being more
aggressive in the capital markets. He would say, ‘you have to
take more risk if you want to earn more.’”
Dash and Creswell (2008)
Moreover, Samuelson (2008) reports “after leaving government, Rubin landed at
Citigroup as ‘senior counsellor.’ He failed to identify toxic mortgage securities as a
big problem in the bank’s own portfolio.” These stories call into question the validity
of the PAU during the debt bubble 2001-2008.
4. Financial Innovations and Regulatory Dialectics
Before going into the specific issue of this section –how government and
financial innovators interact– a brief terminological digression is in order. The
importance of finance and financial innovation is widely recognized. The essential
function of finance is to channel funds from savers to individuals and firms with
productive opportunities. Finance is a facilitator of most (if not all) production
activities as well as of a significant proportion of consumption activities. As a result,
innovations in the financial sector tend to have ramifications throughout the economy.
Any new idea applicable to the essential function of finance is termed a
financial innovation. Examples of financial innovations abound: credit cards,
automatic teller machines (ATMs), de novo Internet banks are a few. Financial
innovation may be either product innovation, such as collateralized mortgages, or
process innovation, such as telephone banking, or organizational innovation, e.g.
research and development financing organizations (RDFOs).
In the business innovation literature it is customary to refer to either product
innovation or process innovation as ‘technological innovation’ irrespective of the
nature of the product or process. Viewed in this context, any product/process financial
innovation is always a technological innovation but the converse is not necessarily
true. For example, a new design for a car constitutes a technological innovation but it
is clearly not a financial innovation.
If necessary, one could introduce the idea of ‘manufacturing innovation’ as
follows. The set of all technological innovations, denoted by TI, includes the set of all
product/process financial innovations, denoted by FI, as a proper set. It may be
convenient to call the difference between TI and FI, the set of manufacturing
innovations MI. With this convention, it follows at once: TI = FI ∪ MI. Note,
however, that FI ∩ MI is not empty as illustrated by the introduction of the ATMs
many years ago which is both a financial innovation and a manufacturing innovation.
The distinguishing features commonly associated with the elements in FI are
generally distinct from those in MI so that it may be methodologically improper to
mix the two sets indiscriminately. This point is explicitly made by Josh Lerner (2005,
p. 224) where he suggests “the need to examine financial innovation as a phenomenon
in its own right.”
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Two aspects associated with the notion of financial innovation, namely
economic benefits and asymmetric information, should be emphasized. First, not all
the elements belonging to FI are economically desirable. This important point has
recently been made by Mason (2008). He distinguishes ‘real’ from ‘nominal’ financial
innovations. A financial innovation that provides economically valuable benefits
constitutes a real financial innovation. Nominal financial innovations are financial
instruments that increase compensation without providing lasting economic benefits. 9
Second, the empirical evidence supports the view that “Financial innovations
inexorably create conditions of asymmetric information that can lead to financial
crises and panics.” Mason (2008, p. 8).
The foregoing suggests a possible definition of ‘toxic” (or economically
malignant) financial innovation that may be useful for analytical purposes. A toxic
financial innovation is a nominal innovation which singly or jointly with other
financial innovations provokes a financial crisis. The existence of toxic financial
innovations presupposes not only loose monetary policy but also poor supervision. It
is generally agreed that the sub-prime mortgage innovation in combination with
securitization and CDOs led to the financial crisis 2007-2008, and therefore, the subprime mortgage is an example of toxic financial innovation.
What are the economic/environmental conditions that increase the number of
elements in the set FI? It has long been recognized that regulatory and tax changes are
inextricably linked to the production of financial innovations. 10 Financial innovation
is regarded as a by-product of regulation because financial engineers try to circumvent
regulatory constraints by introducing new elements in the set FI. For example, Van
Horne (1985, esp. pp. 622-623) included within the group of key factors prompting
financial innovations regulatory and tax changes. A similar point is emphatically
made by Nobel Prize winner Merton H. Miller: 11
What process stimulated the new and energized the
dormant innovations in finance over the past twenty
years? I wish I could say that it was the flood of MBAs
out of our business schools over this period. That was
essentially part of the story, but not the decisive part.
The major impulses to successful financial innovations
over the past twenty years have come, I am saddened to
have to say, from regulations and taxes. (…)
(…) The government is virtually subsidizing the process
of financial innovation just as it subsidizes the development
of new seeds and fertilizers, but with the important
difference that in financial innovation the government’s
contribution is typically inadvertent. There are cases,
9

This is a slightly modified version of the original definition formulated by Mason (2008, p. 11):
“Nominal innovations are vehicles that primarily increase Wall Street compensation with few real
benefits.”
10
This is not to deny that regulations and taxes may induce innovative activity in the manufacturing
sector as well. For example, in the approach to climate change known as ‘emissions trading scheme’
the ultimate government’s purpose is to encourage manufacturing innovation. The point here is that
financial innovation is unintendedly encouraged by the government.
11
Miller received the 1990 Nobel Prize in economics jointly with Harry M. Markowitz and William F.
Sharpe for their pioneer work in the theory of financial economics.
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particularly in the politically sensitive housing area, where
the U.S. government has been the major pioneer of new
financial instruments. For the most part, however, the role
of government in producing the pearls of financial
innovation over the past twenty years has been essentially
that of the grain of sand in the oyster.
M.H. Miller (1986, pp. 460-461).
Time after time financial innovators have found ways to work around
regulation. For instance, the auction-rate security innovation introduced in the 1980s
is virtually equivalent to a bank loan, but they are not regulated like banks. All in all,
the transition from traditional banking (banks make loans and hold them on their
books) to modern banking revolving around securitization (banks pool and sell
repackaged assets from mortgages to student loans) may be regarded as the
unintended outcome of the creation of financial innovation induced by government
action.
Regulations designed to maintain financial stability (such as rules on banks’
capital adequacy) abound. However, financial crises happen. Minsky (1977) and
Kindleberger (1978) have argued for the inherent instability of the financial system,
but in doing so have had to assume irrational behaviour. None of these authors have
emphasized that the interaction between regulators and financial innovators may in
fact be responsible for financial instability.
The notion of ‘regulatory dialectic’ goes back to the classic work of Edward J.
Kane (1977) some thirty years ago. Regulation of the financial system is seen as an
endless game of back and forth. Financial innovators short-circuit regulator intentions
by finding and exploiting loopholes. Regulators find themselves trying to catch up
with their regulatees because innovators enjoy ‘first-mover advantage.’ In fact,
regulators are at a disadvantage because they become aware of the existence of the
new financial instruments after the commercialization of the new ideas has taken
place.
Or, to put it differently, the efforts of regulators to avoid financial excesses are
superseded or nullified by profit-seeking innovators designing new financial products
to overcome the constraints imposed by the government, and thereby, a ‘Sisyphus
Stone process’ takes place. 12 New regulations emerge and generate incentives to
innovate in order to maximize profits by finding novel mechanisms to circumvent the
constraints (for example, the pooled asset-backed securities got around financial
regulations such as rules on banks’ capital adequacy). Within the new financial
instruments created to overcome government regulations there are toxic innovations
conducive –after a number of years and in combination with other factors– to a
financial crisis. This, in turn, provokes a new wave of regulation.
Formalizing the (evolutionary) game first described by Kane (1977) does not
appear to be an easy task. The mathematical formalization would involve a complex
dynamics allowing both the convergence to some equilibrium in the absence of toxic
12

Sisyphus was a legendary king of Corinth whose wickedness in life was punished in the lower world
where he had to roll a huge rock up a hill which as soon as it had reached the top rolled down again.
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financial innovations as well as dynamic discontinuities reflecting the bursting of
financial bubbles. To the best of my knowledge, evolutionary game theory has not yet
provided a model able to capture this esoteric dynamics originated by financial
innovations. Catastrophe theory may provide one of the building blocks because this
mathematical formalism involves a fast dynamics allowing either convergence to
equilibrium or dynamic discontinuities (termed ‘catastrophes’) depending on the path
followed by the system. 13
5. Regulation Failure
Although it is not my purpose to explain how the current financial crisis
resembles the one that happened in the period 1930-1933 (or how it does not), there
are important elements in common that can be mentioned to put the proposal of this
paper in perspective. Given this historical background, attention will be turned to the
central issue of the paper.
The similarities between these financial crises include, but are not limited to,
the introduction of critical business innovations, the brief recessions of 1920-1921 and
2000-2001, and the stock market crashes of October 1929 and October 2008. More
specifically, two technological innovations (the automobile and the Internet) and two
financial innovations (the investment trust and the sub-prime mortgage) provided
important stimulus to investment and growth in the corresponding periods.
The investment trust was a company whose purpose was to speculate in other
companies’ shares using leverage to magnify returns. 14 The holding company with
investment in and control of an operating company or another holding company was
another important innovation. However, the line between an investment trust and a
holding company was often a shadowy one.
It would not be difficult to find more commonalities, e.g. credit squeezes, a
boom in real estate and the spread of speculative behaviour in widening circles, but
for the purposes of this paper one additional and important analogy is as follows:
before the above mentioned stock market crashes there was little support for new
regulation of financial markets.
Two striking differences between the financial crises in question can be found
in the chronological order of the stock market crashes and in the regulatory
environments. While the stock market crash of 1929 preceded the financial crisis
1930-1933, the stock market crash of 2008 followed the financial crisis that first
struck in 2007. As to the regulatory environments, the following points can be made.
There was a regulatory void before and during the period 1930-1933. In contrast,
regulations concerning the financial system were abundant during the period 20002008. 15

13

Pol (1993) contains an evaluation of catastrophe theory from the economic viewpoint.
The world’s first investment trust was the Foreign & Colonial Investment Trust established in 1868.
Investment trusts, were sarcastically described as ‘new engines of financial progress’ by John Kenneth
Galbraith (1979, p. 52).
15
It is true that the Bill Clinton administration helped loosen Depression-era banking regulations by,
for example, allowing banks to expand beyond their conventional role as lenders and relaxing oversight
14
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A tide of regulation came during the Great Depression of the 1930s. 16 Before
March 1933 the US financial system was assumed to be self-regulating. The President
Roosevelt’s “bank holiday’ marked the beginning of an extensive government
intervention in all aspects of the financial structure. According to Ben Bernanke,
March 1933 was a “watershed month” because it was the starting point of both
economic recovery and substantial government intervention. Furthermore, he states
It might be argued that the federally directed financial
rehabilitation –which took strong measures against the
problems of both creditors and debtors– was the only
major New Deal program that successfully promoted
economic recovery. In any case, the large government
intervention is prima facie evidence that by this time the
public had lost confidence in the self-correcting powers
of the financial structure.
Bernanke (1983, p.272) [Italics added]
The Great Depression that followed the stock market crash of October 1929 is
the event that shaped many regulatory institutions in the US economy, including the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 17 During the peak of the Great
Depression the US Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933. This law, together
with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (which created SEC) was designed to
promote market stability and to protect investors. Nowadays, the SEC’s functional
responsibilities are organized into four Divisions and 19 Offices. The Division of
Trading and Markets is responsible for “maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient
markets.”
One of the distinguishing features of the financial crisis 2007-2008 was
regulation failure, not lack of regulation. The failure emerged from the inability of
financial market regulations and supervisory systems in some developed countries to
stop excessive risk taking and faulty management practices. For example, the failure
of SEC can be easily verified by looking at the US Securities and Exchange
Commission home page (What do we Do?) 18 , where one can find the mission of the
Office of Risk Assessment (ORA):
The Office of Risk Assessment helps the SEC anticipate,
identify, and manage risks, focusing on early identification
of new or resurgent form of fraud and illegal or questionable
activities. ORA focuses on risk issues across the corporate
and financial sector, including issues relevant to corporate
disclosure, market operation, sales practices, new product
of esoteric financial products. But it is true, also, that the amount of regulations addressing the formal
as opposed to the shadow, banking system was still substantial over 2001-2008.
16
Economic historians emphasize that the Great Depression of the 1930s and the stock market crash of
October 1929 are related to each other, but they are distinguishable phenomena. In fact, the US
economy started tuning down before the stock market crash. Gordon (1974, Ch 2, esp. p. 45). In the
formal economics literature, Bernanke (1983) provides the best explanation of the protracted
depression of the 1930s extant.
17
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt appointed Joseph P. Kennedy –President John F. Kennedy’s
father– to serve as First Chairman of the SEC.
18
Search done on Google, 11 December, 2008
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innovation, and other activities of financial markets participants.
ORA analyses information from a variety of sources, such as
external experts, domestic and foreign agencies, industry and
financial services, empirical data and other market data. The
Office develops and maintains the overall process for risk
assessment throughout the SEC and serves as a resource for
divisions and other offices in their risk assessment efforts,
working closely with them as they work to identify, prioritize
and mitigate risks.
Wall Street’s worst year in decades culminated with another regulation failure:
the Madoff Affair. Christopher Cox, the SEC’s chairman, recognized that SEC
overlooked Mr Madoff financial innovation consisting of a pyramid strategy in which
existing investors’ returns were topped up with money from new investors. This Ponzi
scheme fraud could be on the order of $US50 billion. 19
In November 2008, the existence of regulation failure was explicitly
recognized by the Group of Twenty (G-20): 20 “Policy-makers, regulators and
supervisors, in some advanced countries, did not adequately appreciate and address
the risks building up in financial markets, keep pace with financial innovation, or take
into account the systemic ramifications of domestic regulatory actions.”
What this crisis has highlighted is not the need for more regulation per se, but
the need for more relevant regulation, that is, regulation conducive to more efficient
global financial markets without stifling economic activity, in general, and financial
innovation, in particular.
The institutional innovation presented in the next section is designed to “keep
pace with financial innovation” and is premised on three ideas. First, even if the
public had an enabling description of a financial innovation, automatic understanding
of the new idea would not be guaranteed. Second, an independent evaluation of both
direct and collateral effects of financial innovations would be extremely useful to
avoid the disruptive impact of toxic financial instruments. Finally, to break the Stone
of Sisyphus process, it is necessary to evaluate ex-ante (before commercialization) the
consistency of the proposed financial innovation with the current regulatory system.
6. An Institutional Innovation
Bell and Quiggin (2006) developed the argument that no effective policy
response to asset price bubbles is possible without at least partial reversal of
deregulation. In relation to the desirability of financial innovation, they pointed out
the existence of two antagonistic eras. During the postwar era there was a
presumption against financial innovation and in the current era of deregulation there is
a presumption in favour of financial innovation. Nowadays, any financial innovation
is genuinely beneficial almost by definition: “In general, no process of regulatory
19

For more details, see : “Dumb Money and Dull Diligence” and “Con of the Century,” The
Economist, 20 December, 2008, pp. 17-18 and pp. 119-121, respectively.
20
The G-20 grew out the 1997 Asian financial crisis. It is a forum that promotes cooperation between
advanced and developing countries on global economic stability. For example, the G-20 contributes to
the strengthening of the international financial architecture.
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approval is required before a new financial instrument is adopted.” Bell and Quiggin
(2006, p. 646).
Market fundamentalists have an absurd criterion for judging whether an
innovation has increased social welfare: are people willing to pay their hard-earned
money for it? During 2001-2008 many people were willing to buy financial products
such as sub-prime mortgages but the bursting of the financial bubble in October 2008
could hardly be considered as a social welfare-enhancing event. Foreclosures, for
example, entail extremely high social costs because (a) the homeowners are forced to
move (some become homeless), and thereby, their children have to switch to new
schools; (b) neighbourhoods suffered because vacant homes reduce the value of
nearby properties; (c) lenders are harmed because by the time that the homes are sold
a substantial proportion of the value of the loan is lost; and finally, (d) local
governments are negatively affected because of the reduction of property tax revenue
and cuts in local public services.
One of the finest problems for economists and politician is to draw the
boundaries between government and markets, to determine what the government
should take upon itself to improve economic performance, and what it should leave to
the market. In particular, what government controls are necessary to help markets?
Interventionists believe that unfettered capitalism may not be satisfactory in many
respects and therefore government should and does have a role to play in the market
economy. Specifically, their view is that government decisions should focus on those
enabling activities which are undertaken by no one if the government does not
undertake them. 21
Let us start by stating the obvious. An innovation is a new idea and a new idea
is not necessarily socially desirable. For example, the ‘cigarette’ was an innovation
exhibiting devastating effects worldwide. Moreover, there is a widespread inability to
anticipate the future impact of innovations. 22
In particular, the law of unanticipated consequences often finds applications in
the field of innovation. A new idea may trigger changes that go far beyond the
intentions of the original innovators. For example, many innovations such as
biological innovations or financial innovations affect complex systems with
interconnected parts, and consequently, the law of unanticipated consequences may
find important applications in these areas. It goes without saying that ‘unanticipated
consequences’ should not be identified with ‘consequences that are necessarily
undesirable from the standpoint of society,’ that is, unforeseen effects are not always
undesirable effects.
If we were omniscient, that is, if all the implications of any new idea were
intuitively obvious, the law of unanticipated consequences would be irrelevant. Short
of such powers, we have to recognize that in some cases the impact of creativity (be it
in biology, finance or anything else) may require some sort of independent scrutiny.

21
22

This view goes back to Keynes (1926, esp. p. 291).
This point is forcibly made by Nathan Rosenberg (1995).
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Market fundamentalism postulates that the ultimate discipline and correction
for business innovations must come from the market itself irrespective of the cost
incurred by society. Scrutiny is neither necessary nor desirable. The current financial
crisis suggests –correctly– that this axiom may entail unjustifiable social costs. The
case for regulation is simple, yet fundamental: financiers make egregious mistakes
and society has to pay for them.
For society to be the winner in the ‘financial innovation game,’ some sort of
market-friendly regulatory institution should be introduced. Or, to put it differently, a
new institutional arrangement is needed to stop the Sisyphus Stone process inherent to
the financial system. To show how such a process might be stopped, I describe a
specific policy proposal. Whatever the final judgement is on this particular proposal,
the key point will be, I hope, clear. To promote efficiency and financial stability, it is
not enough to believe in the PAU. We need new institutional arrangements to
guarantee that the market participants are well informed and above all protected from
financially irresponsible innovations.
The role of regulatory agencies as providers of information is to help avoid a
welfare cost due to misinformation. The public’s interest is particularly important
when very little is known about the new products or processes to be placed in the
market and when the consequences for society may be catastrophic. For example, it is
entirely reasonable for society to impose its evaluation of risk on the producers of
potentially toxic products or the builders of nuclear plants rather than rely on the
assumption that innovators, in the profit interest, will be socially responsible.
The Financial Innovation Administration (FIA) would be an international
regulatory agency responsible for protecting and promoting long-run global financial
stability, hopefully free of political meddling. The key tenet underlying the FIA is that
the mere production of a financial innovation should not automatically allow the
commercialization of the new financial product or process. Any financial innovator
(private or public) must apply for both registration and evaluation of the new financial
idea.
Certainly, a case-by-case approach has at least the virtue of generating basic
empirical knowledge which will ultimately prove decisive in promoting financial
stability. One of the major obstacles to the study of financial innovations has been the
scarcity of data. To overcome this data void, Josh Lerner had to develop a database of
financial innovations by compiling all articles in the Wall Street Journal between
1990 and 2002 related to novel financial products. See Lerner (2006, especially
Appendix, pp. 249-253).
This proposal has an obvious parallel with the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) and comparable organizations operating in almost every country. In a similar
way as biological innovations are subject to clinical trials before they are allowed to
enter the market, financial innovations should be subject to minimal logic scrutiny –
and possibly to trial periods– before full commercialization is allowed. Needless to
say, the FIA will have to develop rules regarding the tests that all financial innovation
should pass before the commercialization of the corresponding financial products or
process is allowed.
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Financial innovations that spread risk in an intelligible way, reduce the cost of
capital, allow more people access to credit and make the system more resilient to
shocks are acceptable and welcome. Examples of financial innovations that should not
be allowed to enter the financial system are not difficult to find. Three obvious
schemes that constitute malignant innovations are as follows. First, financial
innovations involving loans that can be repaid only under the assumption of continual
increases in the price of the asset in question; second, financial innovations involving
reckless banking (i.e. granting loans without regard to the borrowers’ ability to repay);
and third, financial innovations paying returns to investors out of the money
contributed by subsequent investors rather than from revenues generated by genuine
cash flow (Ponzi scheme). 23
Furthermore, financial innovations that spread uncertainty in the strict sense
(not risk), and thereby, render financial markets vulnerable to crashes should be
rejected. Had the FIA been in place, the growth of uncertainty originated by dodgy
securitized assets might have been checked before they could have wrought their
damage.
Or, to add one more example which by no means exhausts the list of
possibilities, consider the following hypothetical case imagined with the help of the
information provided by The Earth’s Leading Lunar Real Estate Agency that can be
found in Google. The innovator, say a bank, has designed a new-fangled financial
product to sell lots on the Moon (say, minimum lot size 1000 acres at $100 per acre)
secured with real estate on the Earth and with repayments possibly starting in the year
when humans return to the Moon. There are categories of property on the land
(premium, standard, etc) in each of the following regions: Lunar Alps, Sea of Cold,
Ocean Storms, Bay of Rainbow and Sea of Vapours. Specifically, the innovator offers
the following deal to buyers of property on the Moon: (a) buy today and pay the first
instalment when humans return to the Moon; (b) start paying your monthly
repayments today and choose the year of return to the Moon; if you happen to select
the correct year (meaning the year of actual return) you will automatically receive
50% reduction of the principal without any additional qualifications; and finally, (c)
before the return of humans to the Moon, you have the option of moving from (a) to
(b) or vice versa, but a fee applies. To enter this agreement you have to guarantee
your repayments with real estate on the Earth. The bank plans to securitize the
resulting mortgages, packing them on the basis of the above mentioned categories of
property in the different geographical regions on the Moon. This financial innovation
is surrounded by uncertainty (for example, the 1967 UN Outer Space Treaty states
that space property “is not subject to national appropriation” but remains silent about
the role of private and corporate owners) and has the potential for engendering a
bubble, particularly when we approach the year of the return to the Moon.
When a new institutional arrangement is proposed, it is human nature to point
out risks and shortcomings. There are at least three arguments that could be made
23

The Ponzi scheme requires an ever increasing flow of money paid by later investors in order to keep
the scheme going, and thereby, the strategy is destined to collapse. Ponzi schemes are illegal. What
matters, however, is to detect the existence of Ponzi schemes ex-ante, not ex-post when the financial
damage has been inflicted.
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against the FIA. First, the standard criticism would be that the government role in the
author’s proposal would end up being far more intrusive than the author assumes.
Commonsense leads one to believe that the degree of regulatory intervention of the
FIA would be comparable to that of the FDA in the field of biological innovation and
certainly less than the unprecedented intrusion of America’s government in the recent
past
In two tumultuous weeks the Federal Reserve and the Treasury
between them nationalise the country’s two mortgage giants,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; took over AIG, the world’s largest
insurance company; in effect extended government deposit
insurance to $3.4 trillion in money-market funds; temporarily
banned short-selling in over 900 mostly financial stocks; and,
most dramatic of all, pledged to take up to $700 billion of toxic
mortgage-related assets on to its books. (…)
The Economist, 11 October, 2008. 24
Another extraordinary example of government intervention happened on 24
November, 2008. When Citigroup announced more than $US65 billion in losses,
write-downs for troubled assets and charges to account for future losses, the US
government took the unprecedented step of guaranteeing $US306 billion on troubled
mortgage assets held by Citigroup to restore confidence and stop Citigroup following
Wall Street rival Lehman Brothers into bankruptcy.
Few economists would deny that the pure teachings of the ultra-free market
approach have been violated, for example, with the $US700 billion US bailout
package. This rescue plan has really abrogated contracts and changed the rules after
the fact.
Second, it might be argued that there are appropriability problems associated
with the FIA. This argument can be disposed of easily. The predominant view
nowadays is that business methods, in general and financial innovations, in particular,
are patentable subject matter. The notion of the “business methods exception”
established in a 1908 US court decision was explicitly rejected by the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the centralized appellate court for patent cases) in
1998. Financial innovations protected by trade secrets, copyrights or trademarks are
surpassingly rare.
Finally, it could be argued that the FIA is unlikely to be internationally
accepted, and therefore, the present proposal is of limited scope. There are at least two
obvious reasons to believe that the FIA could gain general acceptance. First, a global
agreement to evaluate financial innovations will be less difficult to achieve than an
international agreement on greenhouse emissions or arms control because the cost of
implementing the FIA are relatively small and the degree of government interference
with the economy is negligible. Second, the FIA is entirely consistent with one of the
medium-term actions established by the G-20 group of nations in Washington (15
November, 2008): “International standard setting bodies, working with a broad range
24

This quotation comes from Special Report on the World Economy, entitled “When Fortune
Frowned,” included in the 11 October 2008 issue (p. 3).
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of economies and other appropriate bodies should ensure that regulatory policy
makers are aware and able to respond rapidly to evolution and innovation in financial
markets and products.”
7. Summary and Concluding Comments
It is true that the assumption of transparency implies that all the relevant data
are well understood by the economic agents, but it is hard to see why this should be
true. I call this implication Postulate of Automatic Understanding (PAU). This
postulate is the tacit presumption of both the efficient market hypothesis and the
assumption of rational expectations. There are compelling examples suggesting that
the PAU was not applicable during the debt bubble 2001-2008.
Broader access to credit fuelled the US housing bubble. Securitization made it
even easier to lend to less creditworthy borrowers. Securities were used to transmute
one form of uncertainty (risk) into another (uncertainty in the strict sense).
Specifically, the fast dynamics dramatically spread the ignorance zone about the scale
of risks and who held them. A world dominated by uncertainty in Knight’s sense bred
illiquidity and offered little profitable scope for the time consuming nature of
production. The global financial system collapsed in October 2008 and this made it
difficult for borrowers to obtain funds for investment.
The view that government intervention in the economy is always pernicious is
wrong both scientifically and morally. It is wrong scientifically because no one has
ever proved –and probably never will– the following impossibility theorem: for any
governmentless economy in which the necessary conditions for economic efficiency
are not met, it is impossible to improve social welfare through government
intervention. It is wrong morally because it means that economic freedom has no
boundaries. For example, according to market fundamentalists predatory economic
behaviour with devastating externalities such as expropriation of savings in pension
funds should be allowed because markets are always right and governments always
wrong to interfere. This political philosophy of unfettered capitalism does not accept
that markets can transform risk into uncertainty and misallocate resources or that
financial systems without relevant regulation are a recipe for economic disaster.
Conventional wisdom in economics teaches us that governments direct and
interact with the economy. For example, standard economic textbooks recognize
without apology that three of the major economic functions of the government are
improving economic efficiency, stabilizing the economy and preventing
commercialization of toxic products.
The housing and credit bubble 2001-2008 can be regarded as an historical
period culminating with a double failure, market failure and regulation failure. This
paper has proposed an institutional innovation, namely the Financial Innovation
Administration (FIA) with the purpose of strengthening financial stability. Quite
obviously, the FIA is in line with the regulatory vision proposed by the G-20 in
November 2008. In particular, one of the decisions emerging from the G-20 states:
“We will strengthen financial market transparency, including
by enhancing required disclosure of complex financial products
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and ensuring complete and accurate disclosure by firms of their
financial conditions.”
In essence, the tasks of the FIA would include evaluation and registration of
financial innovations. It would not be the purpose of the FIA to establish the level of
novelty involved in the new financial ideas. Van Horne (1985, p. 622) made the point
that some financial innovations are bogus in the sense that they have “little or no
substance when we peel away the veneer, other than to their promoters.” However, it
is the patent office task, not the FIA task, to establish whether these innovations are
truly innovative. Quite obviously, no one should expect that the FIA is the ‘open
sesame’ to the elimination of financial crises. What it can do is to reduce their risk
and cost.
When a new regulation such as the FIA is proposed, there is a natural
tendency to focus on its potential drawbacks. However, it is also important to
recognize that, when there are enabling activities that private individuals cannot fulfil,
such as judging whether financial innovations should be allowed because they are
conducive to economic efficiency or should be abandoned because they have the
potential for creating price bubbles or fraud, relevant government regulation is both
necessary and desirable.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the proposal of the present paper is not
one to be dealt exhaustively in a few pages and it would not be difficult to qualify the
foregoing argument. For example, because financial innovation bears only part of part
of the blame the introduction of the FIA will, at best, yield part of the relevant
regulation and oversight necessary to avoid financial catastrophes. But I hope to have
carried the analysis far enough to permit the following broad conclusion: financial
innovations –like pharmaceutical drugs– can contribute to or detract from human
welfare, and therefore, we need to “involve society in exercising directive intelligence
through some appropriate organ of action over many of the inner intricacies of private
business, yet it would leave private initiative and enterprise unhindered. Even if these
measures prove to be insufficient, nevertheless, they will furnish us with better
knowledge than we have now for taking the next step.”
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Appendix: Financial Innovation, Uncertainty and Collapse
This appendix highlights some aspects of the recent financial history and puts
others in the background. A comprehensive explanation of the main events of the
credit squeeze in 2007-2008 can be found in Brunnermeier (2008). 25 The process of
discarding the inessentials and going straight for the essential elements involved in the
debt bubble 2001-2008 is equivalent to constructing an historical sequence starting in
2001 and ending in the last quarter of 2008 where the terms of this sequence indicate
the important aspects to be taken into account.
The first term of the debt bubble sequence is a financial innovation, namely
the sub-prime mortgage, and the last term is the bursting of the bubble or the seizing
up of the world’s credit markets. The description of this sequence is of absolutely
fundamental importance because it shows a case in which risky assets were
metamorphosed into uncertain assets and the whole system collapsed. Let us start by
the last term of the debt bubble sequence:
Global financial intermediation is broken. That intricate
and interdependent system directing the world’s savings
into productive capital investment was severely weakened
in August 2007. The disclosure that highly leverage financial
institutions were holding toxic securitized American subprime
mortgages shocked market participants. For a year, banks
struggled to respond to investors demands for larger capital
cushions. But the effort fell short and in the wake of the
Lehman Brothers default on September 15th 2008, the system
cracked. Banks fearful of their own solvency, all but stopped
lending. Issuance of corporate bonds, commercial paper and a
wide variety of other financial products largely ceased. Creditfinanced economic activity was brought to a virtual standstill.
The world faced a major financial crisis.
Greespan (2008, p. 122)
Each financial crisis is unique in terms of its causes and the types of assets that
involves. The unique manifestation of the debt bubble 2001-2008 was the growing
importance of interlinked securities, i.e. sub-prime mortgages, debt securitization and
derivatives.
Providing mortgage finance to low income and minority households is a social
goal in many rich countries. The main issue to be confronted in lending to this group
is that the borrowers are riskier because of two issues: (a) insufficient funds (they do
not have enough funds for the down payment on the house); and (b) credit issues
(they have either no credit history or prior problems repaying debts). A financial
innovation was necessary to answer the following daunting question: how can a
mortgage loan be designed to make lending to riskier borrowers potentially profitable.
‘Sub-prime mortgages’ were a profit-seeking financial innovation aimed at answering
25

This paper succeeds in illuminating the facets of the debt bubble sequence, including important
elements omitted in the description provided here. For example, Brunnermeier (2008, esp. pp. 21-29)
outlines four different amplification mechanisms of the losses in the mortgage market that are not
mentioned in the following sketch of the debt bubble.
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this question. The new idea associated with the sub-prime mortgage is as follows: the
borrower and the lender can take advantage of the house appreciation over short
horizons.
A representative sub-prime mortgage can be described in four steps. First, a
subprime mortgage starts with a fixed interest rate (‘teaser’ rate, say 7% per year) and
incorporates a variable interest rate (‘reset’ rate or ‘step-up rate, say LIBOR plus 8%)
after an initial period of time of two or three years. Second, the appreciation of the
house is the basis for refinancing every two or three years. Third, the lender makes the
choice to refinance or not at the end of the initial period and the borrower may be
rolled into another sub-prime mortgage. Finally, another important feature of a
subprime mortgage is the prevalence of prepayment penalties.
It is well-known that the sub-prime mortgage innovation engendered excesses.
The extreme case was known as ‘ninja’ loans (no income, no job, no assets). An
analysis of the America’s housing market madness can be found in Michael Lewis
(2008). In this book one can find the following example of ‘financial alchemy’: a
couple bought a house for $1.16 million with no money down and they secured loans
worth $1.5 million on that house; they then extracted $333,000 to spend on consumer
products and lived in a nice home for three years before they walked away. 26
The US housing boom period started in 2001 and ended in 2006: US housing
prices reached a peak in 2006 exceeding replacement costs by as much as 100% and
fell 50% from this peak in 2006-2007. The high housing prices of 2001-2006 were a
short-run response to high demand. Expectations were not rational because
individuals assumed that housing prices will keep on rising forever, while elementary
economic logic predicts that housing prices will revert back to replacement costs.
The foregoing suggests that the US housing market bubble would fit nicely
into the textbook case where the bubble is highly localized, e.g. confined to a
domestic market. However, there were financial instruments and new technologies
operating concurrently that engendered a high-powered bubble, that is, a bubble that
propagates to other markets.
Sub-prime mortgages were financed via securitization. In essence,
securitization means that banks and other lenders pool their loans into securities and
sell them to investors in order to make new loans. During the development of the debt
bubble lenders sold their riskiest mortgages to investment banks which in turn packed
them into securities identified as Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs). Three
points should be made here. First, securitization is decades old. Second, CDOs are
financial instruments used by investment banks to off-load risk. Third, CDOs not only
package commercial and residential mortgages but also other forms of debt such as
credit cards and car loans.
Securitization transferred ownership of mortgages from lenders who knew
their borrowers (lenders had information about the probability of default of their
borrowers) to investors who did not. In fact, investment banks turned risky assets into
investments that would be suitable to investors who would know nothing about the
26

See Roberts (2007).
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risk characteristics of the underlying assets. CDOs were classified by degree of risk
and allocated to categories referred to as ‘tranches,’ for example, senior (lower
risk/lower yield), mezzanine (medium risk/medium yield) and junior (higher
risk/higher yield). 27
As the housing market around the US took flight, the CDO market grew
immensely as more and more mortgages were pooled into new-fangle securities:
lenders over-lent, builders over-built and buyers over-paid. Over time, the size and
complexity of the ‘financial repacking’ increased. Investment banks manufactured
‘synthetic’ securities that made the underlying risks even more opaque. In fact, these
banks sliced up CDOs and repackaged them into CDOs of CDOs known as CDOs
squared or CDO2s. There were cases of CDO3s.
Four points should be stressed. First, firms issuing CDOs generated fees of 0.4
to 2.5 percent of the quantity sold; for example, Citigroup made up to $US500 million
in fees from the CDO business in 2005 alone. Second, the investment banks sold the
CDOs to institutional investors around the world. Third, the market for Credit Default
Swaps (CDSs) enabled banks to insure against failure of the new-fangled credit
products. 28 Finally, investment banks carried large positions of CDOs off balance
sheet and developed Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs). As the credibility of the
CDOs came into question some investment banks were forced to bail out their SIVs.
CDOs were complex financial products and even professional investors and
experts found it virtually impossible to estimate the risks involved in a particular
CDO. The reason is not far to seek. CDOs involved many forms of bundled debts
creating a black box that could not be penetrated by investors to determine the size
and location of the risks. The average investor was unable (not unwilling) to
understand whether a particular CDO represented value or was a toxic asset.
Having said this, it is an open secret that ratings agencies such as Standard &
Poor’s and Moody’s claimed that they were able to evaluate the risks underlying
CDOs without verifying the information provided in the original loan application.
Using sophisticated econometric models under the assumption that historical patterns
of default were a good predictor of risk they did the job on a regular basis. For
example, they considered securitized pools of, say 2,000 sub-prime mortgages and
using historical performance from 1970s onward they asked: what percentage of
borrowers will pay their loan?
It is clear that the ratings agencies ignored the fact that the mortgage sector
was morphing into a speculative bubble prompted by the sub-prime mortgage
innovation. What may not be as obvious is the fact that the agencies were paid by
those issuing the CDOs, and consequently, there was a conflict of interest. What
mattered to issuers (Wall Street) was the rating –not the accuracy of the risk
evaluation. 29
27

The senior tranche offers low interest rate, but it is the first to be paid out of the cash flows of the
portfolio. At the other extreme, (junior tranche, usually referred to as ‘toxic waste’) will be paid only
after the senior and mezzanine tranches have been paid.
28
The CDS innovation is due to Blythe Masters of J.P. Morgan. This method for insuring against loan
defaults was introduced in 1995.
29
For more details on the issue of conflict of interest and CDOs, see Lowenstein (2008).
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There is evidence that some banks also undertook the task of evaluating CDOs
risk. As an illustration, consider the case of the Citigroup, one of the world’s largest
banks with operations in more than 100 countries. In late 2002, the bank moved
aggressively into CDOs. After five years (circa September 2007), the Citigroup ended
up owning $US43 billion in mortgage-related assets. The bank’s risk evaluation
procedures were grotesque, to say the least. For example, Citigroup’s risk models
assumed away the possibility of a US housing downturn, on which millions of
homeowners could default on their mortgages. As reported by the New York Times,
the Citigroup’s top executives were indulging in daydreams:
Even as the first shock waves of the sub-prime mortgage
crisis hit Bear Stearns in June 2007, Citigroup’s top executives
expressed few concerns about their bank’s exposure to mortgage
related securities.
In fact, when examiners from the Securities and Exchange
Commission began scrutinising Citigroup’s sub-prime mortgage
holdings after Bear Stearns’ problem surfaced, the bank insisted
the probability of those mortgages defaulting was so tiny that
they excluded them from their risk analysis, says a person briefed
on the discussion.
Dash and Creswell (2008)
It is worth noting that there was a global chain reaction ending with the stock
market crashes around the world in October 2008. 30 The Internet was used to disperse
risk on a global basis and to create a ‘shadow banking system’ (or unregulated lending
network) that, by 2007, was as large as the formal banking system. This shadow
system is a nexus of CDOs, credit-default swaps, auction-rate securities, privateequity and hedge funds. In particular, there were financial instruments traded by
instant message in trillion dollar markets.
Securitization and derivatives reduced the financial sector resilience and
magnified the damaging effect of the crash. In October 2008, most of the world’s
largest banks were virtually insolvent and depending on continuing government aid.
Furthermore, losses in one stock market provoked losses in others and international
investors sold everywhere.
For all practical purposes the dynamic process involved a massive
transformation of risk into uncertainty. 31 In a state of affairs chiefly characterized by a
totally unpredictably future, individuals could not possibly follow any course of
action because economic reasoning was worthless. Most financial firms were unable
to raise capital and refused to lend. The predominance of uncertainty in Knight’s
sense created an ‘economic black hole’ that sucked in the real economy.
To sum up, the debt bubble sequence 2001-2008 can be condensed as follows:
30

It is estimated that $US30 trillion of global stock market value was wiped out in the year 2008.
Greenspan (2008, p.121).
31
It was like buying and selling lottery tickets among hard core gamblers where the probability of
success was impossible to calculate and the traders did not even know if there was a prize.
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Toxic financial innovation Æ



Loans are pooled, tranched and then sold via securitization Æ



Uncertainty in Knight’s sense Æ



Collapse,

where the term ‘Collapse’ identifies the financial crisis 2007-2008 and the
corresponding market failure due to the prevalence of Knightian uncertainty.
While some economists may focus on a single cause, and thus on a single
remedy, the sheer number of causal factors that has been identified appears to suggest
that there is a bundle of causes explaining the current financial crisis. In a recent
paper, John B. Taylor has provided empirical evidence about the causes of the
financial crisis 2007-2008 and concluded that this crisis was provoked, prolonged,
and worsened by the US government actions and interventions. Taylor (2009, esp. p.
27). In his view, the use of sub-prime mortgages was a complicating factor and the
complex securitization of these and other mortgages a significant amplification factor.
One way of knowing whether the existence of a malignant innovation in combination
with securitization was necessary for the financial crisis to occur would be to
construct a model to see what would have happened in the counter-factual event
where the sub-prime mortgage innovation did not exist.
As I mentioned in the introduction to the present paper, the debt bubble
sequence is just a slice of an extraordinary complex dynamic process. It is generally
agreed that there is a collection of causal factors of the financial crisis that began in
2007 and gathered intensity in 2008. Jackling (2009) has identified and tabulated 26
particular causal factors, not necessarily independent of each other. A glance at Table
1 in Jackling (2008) shows that the common thread connecting most (if not all) of
these factors is a relatively small set of financial innovations.
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